When the Iraqi government failed to deliver the draft constitution on time, everyone on my compound began offering their thoughts for solving the constitutional deadlock. Most Americans on my compound didn't understand why the Iraqis refused to compromise. Almost everyone believed that the answers were obvious to the Iraqis - if they really wanted a solution that everyone would support. I believe that making compromises in Iraq was as difficult as making promises in 1781.

One of the more interesting nuances coming out of the constitutional deadline crunch reminded me of the martial law rule in the U.S. House of Representatives. The interim constitution stated that the draft constitution was due on August 15th. The interim constitution included a provision that the Transitional National Assembly (TNA) could grant a six month extension to write the constitution by a simply majority vote, but it didn't give the TNA the authority to make a shorter or longer extension. However, another provision of the constitution said that a 2/3 majority of the TNA could change any provision in the interim constitution. Thus, on the night of the 15th, the TNA simply amended the interim constitution to shift the due date by a week. Then, even though key Iraqi politicians presented the draft constitution on the amended due date, they delayed the TNA's vote on the constitution by another few days to give themselves more time to negotiate.